Introduction
*> Due to obvious limitations of space / time, the scope of this lecture is restricted to Western Europe; and the survey of scholarship is restricted to works published in the English language.
First let me explain the origins of the title for this lecture: 'Fascism... but with an open mind.' I recently received this apparent oxymoron in an email from a university student responding to news that Teesside University was establish-ing a new research centre for the study of past and present forms of fascism. The student (not based at Teesside University) declared himself a 'fascist but one with an open mind.' You might well ask: how can fascism, a demonized ideology, a by-word for genocide driven by fanaticism, possess anything approaching an open-mind? When it comes to understanding developments on the contemporary far right in (Western) Europe, have we really witnessed the emergence of a 'new' breed of fascists -a 'neo-fascism' that has adapted itself to the norms of multi-ethnic, liberal-democratic society? A ' designer fascism' that is fit for the twentyfirst century?
Europe' s contemporary far right has attracted a vast scholarly literature; Western Europe, in particular, occupies a central focus. The expansion in this literature reflects the growth in the far-right phenomenon, above all, the growth, since the 1980s, of a thicket of far-right organizations across numerous European party systems. Yet notwithstanding obvious cross-national variations, we should bear in mind that, as a transnational political force, the far right has only averaged around six per cent of the vote in all European parliamentary elections since 1979. So at the outset, to borrow some wise words from the French political scientist Gilles Ivaldi, let us ' dispel the myth of an ineluctable electoral growth of extreme right forces on the right of the European political spectrum.'1 At first, the study of the contemporary far right in its so-called post-1980 'third wave'2 was largely dominated by the literature of left-wing opponents. This, according to Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, led 'largely to opinionated, speculative, emotional and highly politicised studies' , that is to say, stud-ies ('left') skewed by a 'fascist' or 'neo-fascist' perspective.3 The situation today seems altogether different. Political scientists would have us believe that since the 1980s something entirely detached from fascism, or neo-fascism has emerged -a populist radicalization of mainstream concerns -a novel form of 'radical right-wing populism.' The defining characteristics of this radical rightwing populism would appear to be nativism (i.e. a combination of nationalism with xenophobia), authoritarianism (law and order issues), and populism Despite its best efforts it has not acquired a 'reputational shield.' All too closely associated with fascism, racism, and violent extremism, the BNP' s brand remains toxic.9
So, must historians of fascism, specifically those for whom fascism did not die in 1945 -and I count myself amongst these -concede that fascist or neo-fascist ideology no longer plays a central role in defining the world-view of the contemporary far right; that neo-fascism as a theoretical tool for analyzing the contemporary far right should be abandoned since it rests on all too vague notions of historical continuity; and that lax application of the term 'neofascism' merely reinforces the view that the contemporary far right is some kind of anomalous domain outside the mainstream, inhabited by the grubby lunatic fringe?
Fascism after 1945
As the opening words to a recent volume on the extreme right in contemporary Europe put it, ' acres of print' have been dedicated to the subject of rightwing extremism since the first significant breakthrough of the phenomenon occurred in France during the 1980s.10 The contrast between now and the first few decades after 1945, when scholarly literature on the contemporary extreme right stretched no further than a handful of books, is stark. The standard response in the 1960s and 1970s was to proclaim that the age of fascism came to an end in 1945 -fascism was now dead. Few seemed interested in the possi-bility that fascism had re-emerged; and those that did often found their audi-ence less than receptive. Dennis Eisenberg had his 1967 volume on the reemergence of fascism11 panned as a 'political tract' by one academic reviewer;12 an equally withering verdict awaited a sprawling volume written by two left-wing Italian journalists. rubbished by Gerhard Weinberg who described it as being 'filled with preposterously erroneous pseudo-history.'14 While reticent to offer definitive answers to fascism' s present and future trajectory, a further work of that period, Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf ' s15 Fascism,16 published in 1973, identified four theoretical possibilities. The first was that the epoch of fascism was definitely over. Where right-extremist sects and organizations remained they were but 'post-fascist' historical residues of negligible political significance. More or less the dominant orthodoxy, this position was associated with leading historians Ernst Nolte and Hugh Trevor-Roper. The second, a left-wing (Marxist) position, saw in ' even the slightest national or conservative tendency the beginning of a "fascistoid" attitude,'17 in other words a 'latent' fascism embedded within highly developed capitalism. Like flared trousers from that era the term 'fascistoid' is (thankfully) no longer in voguethe term 'fascistic' is the present-day equivalent (describing a regime, organization or person that tends towards, or imitates fascism). A third theoretical possibility was that in efficient, modern technocratic society, fascism is no longer necessary because ' other more harmless means of political repression are available.'18 Schüddekopf might have linked this possibility to the ' end of ideology' thesis: the idea -popular in the 1950s and 1960s -that economic growth and full employment had consigned ideological extremism to the twilight world of cranks and deluded zealots. So if fascism continued to exist, it was not in Europe' s advanced managerial democracies but in the Third World where it could, according to some scholars, take the form of ' possibility, and one that, unfortunately, was dealt with all too briefly by Schüddekopf, was that completely different, new variants of fascism were indeed possible.
The neo-fascist 'thesis'
By the 1980s, at least in the popular imagination, the contemporary extreme right had become synonymous with 'neo-fascism.' Yet conceptualization of the term 'neo-fascism' remained ' elusive.' One scholar who did try pinning it down was the British scholar Christopher T. Husbands who, in a footnote to a paper published in 1981, identified anti-Communism, strong anti-trade union-ism, and stringent anti-libertarianism as the ideological core features of neofascism. 22 For sure, an important factor behind viewing the contemporary far right as 'neo-fascist' had been the political shockwaves generated by the electoral breakthrough of the Front National (FN) in the European elections in 1984 when it had captured close to eleven per cent of the vote and had sent no fewer than ten deputies to the European Parliament. But the intervening years had also seen partial electoral success for Italian and British far-right parties, with both the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI; Italian Social Movement) and the National Front appearing on the verge of major electoral breakthroughs at one stage or another. There had also been a wave of far-right terrorist attacks, symbolized above all by the deadly carnage of the Bologna railway station bomb-ing of August 1980, which had claimed the lives of over eighty people.
A few years prior to the FN's 1984 breakthrough, and yet already responding to popular concerns that 'fascism was back,' Paul Wilkinson penned The New Fascists. This lively, panoramic survey of Western Europe' s 'ultra-right' declared it ' a cardinal error to assume that fascist doctrines and movements are histori-cal phenomena limited to a particular historical period or to specific countries.'23 The political science community remained unconvinced, however. Gordon Smith, Professor of Government at the London School of Economics, was critical of Wilkinson' s blanket labelling of fascism; he called on political scientists to find a new word.24 Meanwhile, Wilkinson himself, while review-ing a 1983 volume on fascism that to his astonishment contained no chapter on contemporary developments, bemoaned that it was '[s]mall wonder that some political scientists and more than a few of their students are still under the In the wake of the FN's 1984 breakthrough, the European Parliament's Socialist Group had proposed a European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into the rise of 'fascism' and 'racism.' The Committee' s report, published in 1985, defined 'fascism' loosely as a generic term incorporating 'interchangeable expressions' such as 'neo-Nazism' , 'neo-fascism' and 'the extremism or the nationalism of the Right.'26 Behind such a deliberately loose definition lurked a political motive: to deny respectability to the extreme right. The FN was viewed by many, especially on the European left, as resurgent fascism -'the fascists in smart suits' , as British Labour MEP Glyn Ford described them.27 This 'neo-fascist thesis' (if we can call it that) was encouraged further still by subsequent volumes titled the Dark Side of Europe (by Geoffrey Harris, 1990); and Fascist Europe (edited by Glyn Ford, 1992) -the cover of Ford's book, which was illustrated with a swastika graphic composed from human bones and barbedwire, left little to the imagination.28 For now, the neo-fascist thesis was winning adherents in academic circles too. The foreword of the volume Neo-Fascism in Europe, published in 1991, which included a chapter on Le Pepénisme, insisted ' on the topicality of neo-fascism as an ideology with a considerable -probably a growing -potential.'29
Rejecting neo-fascism: the response from political science Much conceptual fuzziness remained -the term 'neo-fascism' having entered the fray for political reasons: to warn (or scaremonger) about fascism' s alleged return; to call attention to historical, personal and/or ideological continuities; and to deny far-right parties broader social and political respectability. This literature was, for Cas Mudde, both 'methodologically and analytically weak.' Adding little that was new to our understanding, it was far too preoccupied, Mudde said, with offering ' emotional and normative viewpoints,' and so should be ' considered more as political contributions to the public debate, than seri-ous contributions to the scientific debate.'30 Unsurprisingly blanket use of the term 'neo-fascist' did not go unchallenged.
By the mid-1990s growing numbers of political scientists were insisting that Western Europe had not experienced any upsurge in 'neo-fascism' but the emergence of a new kind of politics entirely. One of the first to challenge the neo-fascist thesis was the Italian political scientist Piero Ignazi who distinguished a 'new' extreme right from an ' old' extreme right. The old extremeright parties were comprised of the likes of the MSI, BNP and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD); the new extreme-right parties -the dominant strain -took in the French National Front, the German Republikaner, and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ; Austrian Freedom Party). The Belgian Vlaams Blok [Flemish Block] fell somewhere in between. These 'new' parties were defined by the absence of a fascist legacy and were, for Ignazi, 'by-products' or the ' offspring' of the conflicts of post-industrial society. They represented the authoritarian counterpart to post-material libertarianism. They were, for Ignazi, new parties of the 'post-material' or 'postindustrial' extreme right.31
The neo-fascist thesis also found itself under attack from a second designation: 'radical right-wing populism.' Rather more elegant than Ignazi's, this particular designation quickly gained traction amongst political scientists. A seminal publication in this regard was Hans-Georg Betz's 1994 comparative study, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Like Ignazi, Betz located the rise of parties such as the FN and the Austrian Freedom Party in the trans-national phenomenon of post-industrial capitalism and social fragmenta-tion. For Betz, radical right-wing populist parties distanced themselves from the traditional extreme right; proposed a neo-liberal economic programme; were united in their opposition to immigration; did not call for a fundamental transformation of the existing socio-economic and socio-political system; and promoted themselves in true populist style as democratic alternatives to the prevailing system.32 In 1998 Betz insisted that 'the notion of right-wing extremism -or worse, neo-fascism -is hardly apt to capture the nature of the contemporary right in established Western democracies. ' This hugely influential study (win-ner of a prestigious American Political Science Association Award) also set the 'new radical right' apart from fascism.35 Other political scientists then followed suit although some singled out populism as the defining feature of the 'new radical right.' Paul Taggart argued in a frequently cited 1995 article that the sharp-suited parliamentary wing of the extreme right represented a 'new populism' or 'neo-populism'36 -employing communication styles that were clear, simple, and which spoke directly to the concerns of ' ordinary' people. But before we are tempted to hitch our wagon to the populist star, we should take heed of Andrea Mammone' s words that, 'populism represents neither a new historical concept nor a latecomer in the history of political phenomena.'37
Although political scientists went on to criticize both Kitschelt and Betz for overstating the extent to which radical-right populist parties espoused neoliberal economic programmes -in fact one, Cas Mudde, argued that their economic programmes were not neo-liberal at all but nativist; and several have raised concerns about whether populism is an appropriate classificatory label since it refers more to a communication style than an ideological trait, many of today' s political scientists remain happy to work within the radical-right popu-list paradigm. What follows is a widely shared belief that the populist radical right is not neo-fascism, but neither is it simply a moderate form of the extreme right. . Kitschelt argued that 'New Radical Right' rhetoric differed from fascist rhetoric in three important respects: first, fascism expressed an anti-capitalist, corporatist thrust whereas the New Radical Right endorsed free market capi-talism with a strong but small state; second, the New Radical Right's authoritarianism derived from a defence of capitalism not the rejection of the free market economy; and third, racism manifested itself as a central component of New Radical Right appeal whereas in some fascist movements, racism had been contingent. Fascism, 1914-45 , his tour de force published in 1995. Even so, for Payne, the issue simply came down to this: ' All the genuine neofascist and neo-Nazi groups remain tiny circles of fringe activists. The right radical parties are stronger … The more broadly they seek to mobilize, the more moderate they are forced to become.'43 Neo-fascism and the radical right were different entities: the former -neo-fascism, in its true sense, continued to exist but on the margins and outside the organiza-tional structures of the latter -the radical right. In the absence of some form of systemic crisis, trying to conceptualize neo-fascism had become, for Payne, 'faintly analogous to the classification of obscure Amazonian languages rap-idly undergoing extinction. '44 So 'Why use the term neofascism in the first place if the neofascists observe the democratic rules of the game?' A question that Walter Laqueur, former director of London' s Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library, asked in the introduction to his 1996 volume, Fascism: Past, Present and Future. Laqueur persevered with the term 'neo-fascism' but he did so only because he was unaware of any better terms and definitions. Such an unconvincing theoretical approach, in which the author actually admits to being 'not happy with my own choice of terms and definitions'45 could only strengthen the claims of his political science colleagues that neo-fascism had become a largely redun-dant conceptual category, and that between historical fascism and Europe' s contemporary 'radical right' , there was very little (if any) continuity.
Neo-fascism in the 'post-fascist' era
The issue, of course, is that there is some very obvious continuity.46 Why speak of the 'return of fascism' when fascism never left us in the first place? This is not to say that radical right-wing populist parties are a repetition of old fascisms -they are clearly not. Like classic fascisms, they may well 'seek to roll back as far as possible the libertarian spirit of the contemporary democratic order and to replace it with an ethnically homogeneous authoritarian state,' as Richard Wolin has observed,47 but this is where the similarity ends. Inter-war fascism had revolutionary totalitarian and not merely authoritarian aspirations. But of greater significance for me is the fact that the history of this 'new party family' is bound up with the history of neo-fascism. Stripping neofascism from this history is, I would argue, ahistorical. The issue that I have with political scientists and their concept of 'radical right-wing populism' is their (sometimes wilful?) lack of concern for the historical development, traditions, and political cultures of neo-fascism. The Swedish sociologist Jens Rydgren has argued that it is wrong to treat these 'new' radical-right parties (Front National; Sverigedemokraterna [Swedish Democrats]; the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid [Party for Freedom]; Austrian Freedom Party, etc.) as discrete entities that emerged independently of one another. Rather, their emergence should be understood in terms of a series of interdependent events. For Rydgren, a critical factor has been the development of a potent new 'master frame' that combines ' cultural racism' (or ethnopluralism) with populist (but not anti-democratic), anti-establishment rhetoric. This has meant that the ' old' extreme-right has been able to free itself from the stigma of biological racism, and also incorporate populist rhetoric without being stigmatized as anti-democratic. According to Rydgren, the ' evident success of this master frame came in 1984 when the Front National got its electoral breakthrough.'48 For Rydgren, the FN's breakthrough set in motion a process of cross-national diffusion whereby other extreme-right parties drew (selectively) from the repertoires and practices of the French National Front. Significantly, this development was, as Rydgren points out, ' a long process, in many ways going back to the neo-fascist international meeting in Rome in 1950' , and 'it did not reach its refined form until the late 1970s and 1980s under the influence of the French Nouvelle Droite. '49 If Le Pen took his populism from the 1950s Poujadist movement, he adopted the doctrine of ethno-pluralism (that is to say, ethnicities or races are not necessarily superior or inferior but different and incompatible) from the French New Right/Nouvelle Droite -a neo-fascist, meta-political revi-sion of fascism.
It would be remiss of me, at this point, not to acknowledge the on-going debate over whether 'neo-fascist' is the most appropriate classification for the Nouvelle Droite (now known as the European New Right on account of its transnational impact). Some have argued that the European New Right had a right to preserve their own ethno-cultural identity and to deny such a right was 'racist.' It delivered, as we have seen, heavy discursive and ideologi-cal ammunition to the French National Front, and then through an ongoing process of cross-national diffusion, impacted across the spectrum of the contemporary European far right. So much so that for Jens Rydren, ethno-pluralist doctrine has become 'the most distinguishing ideological feature of the new radical right party family.'51 The French National Front had been originally launched in 1972 as a 'revolutionary nationalist' party, albeit one intentionally cloaked in the garb of the double-breasted suit. Determined to mirror the successes of their Italian counterparts, the FN had duly adopted the Italian neo-fascist strategy of the 'national right' . This was a parliamentary strategy -one that sought legitimacy as a respectable mass party. If the FN had started out with the intention of making fascism acceptable, when did it morph into something essentially different? Reflect for a moment on the question posed recently by Jim Wolfreys: 'Having founded the FN with a deliberately strategy of courting respectability in order to build a fascist organisation, did they [i.e. the FN leaders] consciously choose an alternative path?'52 When did this happen? Was it when revolutionary nationalists exited the FN in the late 1970s/early 1980s, did it happen only recently when the leadership passed to his daughter, the more 'moderate' Marine Le Pen -someone influenced by De Benoist53 -or has it, in fact, never happened? What historians and political scientists might search for is the far-right equivalent of the German Social Democrats' 1959 Bad Godesberg Congress, when the SPD officially renounced revolutionary Marxism. Yet according to the editors of a recent volume on varieties of right-wing extremism in contemporary Europe, any search will be in vain since the extreme right 'has never produced any sort of Godesberger Programm, democratizing its beliefs and abandoning neo-fascism.'54 The closest a neo-fascist party came to it was the Congress at Fuiggi in January 1995 when the MSI was officially dissolved and replaced by the 'post-fascist' but now defunct Alleanza Nazionale.55 At that moment, Mussolinian fascism might have been consigned to history, but many so-called 'post-fascist' Alleanza Nazionale activists still retained an 'intractable, non-negotiable defence of Italian neo-fascism,' as Anna Cento Bull has revealed.56
I have written extensively on the BNP elsewhere, and I don' t want to repeat myself here. Suffice to say that, if in Italy, it was a case of the spirit of neofascism adapting itself to the double-breasted suit, in Britain it was more a case of the BNP simply picking out a new double-breasted suit off a radical right-populist peg (rather than undergoing any genuine or 'spiritual' conversion to liberal democracy). What further muddies the conceptual waters is that within the cultures of the far right, there is a history of interaction between so-called 'radical-right' actors and their more extreme brethren. This can take numerous forms, through such mechanisms as multiple membership and affiliations, joint mobilizations, transnational networks, social media, voicing support for particular election candidates, and so on. There can be personal bonds too. So rather than fundamental ideological differences, should we not focus on the distinction between the radical right and these more ' extreme' elements as a distinction based more on a strategic division of labour? As one French farright activist remarked: if '[t]hey [the Nouvelle Droite] explore the desirable' then 'we work in the sphere of the possible.'60 For one leading expert on the Nouvelle Droite, it was 'no accident that some ND [Nouvelle Droite] figures like Pierre Vial moved to the FN in the early 1980s' because although they differed on tactics and specifics, they shared a fundamental ideological kinship in their ' antipathy for liberalism, immigration, multiculturalism and the United States, thus making co-operation possible.'61 Even though the FN's programmes might have lacked some of the 'theoretical subtlety' of the Nouvelle Droite, its influence on FN discourses has undoubtedly been 'palpable. '62 The history of the contemporary far right is littered with instances where the new radical right and more extremist groups have crossed paths. Within this political firmament, some obviously think of themselves more as partners than as rivals. Switzerland is a good example here: across many decades ' extreme-right' activists have participated in 'radical-right' populist parties. So even at the more moderate end of the continuum an organization like the Norwegian Progress Party can attract racist and neo-Nazi elements. In 1996, for example, a neo-Nazi group infiltrated the party' s youth movement. The fact that Norwegian terrorist, Anders Breivik, had been a former member of the Progress Party further complicates the 'scientific' quest for neat distinctions. In Britain, the BNP claims to be non-violent but some of the most prominent cases of convicted far-right violent extremists have had clear links to it -the
